Maritime piracy (as well as acts of terrorism) targeting both commercial and non-commercial vessels has become increasingly prevalent in recent years. According to available data, there were approximately 400 reported pirate attacks globally in 2009, out of which about 150 vessels were boarded, over 50 vessels were hijacked, and over 100 vessels were fired upon; also, over 1,000 crew members were taken hostage with about 70 being injured and around 10 confirmed deaths. The comparative numbers for 2008 show about 300 reported incidents and about 40 vessels hijacked. The Gulf of Aden, a hot bed of piracy, was the site of about 120 attacks. Somali pirates have been identified as being responsible for over 200 acts of piracy in 2009, and their reach now extends more than 1,000 miles from the coast of Somalia. The percentage of successful hijackings in the Indian Ocean was about 25% of the vessels attacked through the last quarter of 2009. The over 50 successful hijackings in 2009 resulted in approximately $177 million in total ransoms paid to Somali pirates. In 2010, although there were fewer hijackings (about 44), total ransoms paid were higher, at about $238 million. The attacks continue to increase as have the average quantum of the ransoms paid.
Pirates have proven that the use of high speed conventionally powered small watercraft is highly effective and very difficult to deter. Prior experience in the Gulf of Aden has shown that successful attacks are typically conducted during twilight hours, from astern of and on the port quarter of the targeted vessel. The increased military presence in the Gulf of Aden has effectively forced Somali pirates to extend and venture farther out into the Indian Ocean where potential targets are afforded less protection. They have managed to do this by utilizing hijacked vessels as mother ships. This has enabled pirates to attack vessels up to 1000 miles off the coast of Somalia. Pirates usually favor vessels that are alone, slow moving and loaded, hence with low freeboards.
It is the general policy of insurance companies to pay the very high ransoms demanded for hijacked international flag vessels, cargoes and crews. Indeed, the surge in activity off the east coast of Somalia has, as noted above, led to ransom payments in excess of $200M for this region alone. The total cost of piracy has recently been reported to be about $12 to 15 billion annually. Insurance companies have increased tenfold surcharges for sending a cargo shipment through the Gulf of Aden (according to Lloyds List, approximately 20,000 vessels transited the Gulf of Aden in 2009 alone). Single trip policies through the Gulf of Aden with a $3 million ransom clause, can cost around $30,000, with additional premiums for crew liability. The hike in insurance rates has caused many ship operators to plot routes south of Africa and the Cape of Good Hope. However, this is not always cost effective when carrying time sensitive cargo. Lloyd's estimates the average increase in cost to sail this southerly route to be about $80,000 per trip.
The current deterrents being utilized generally favor the use of armed guards/escorts or other lethal force. However, international authorities have been reluctant to recommend such danger prone and potentially lethal methods. Also, the cost of hiring a security escort to pass through the Gulf of Aden/Suez Canal can be as much as $100,000, depending on the ship's size and the value of its cargo. The costs associated with deployment of armed guards are increasing relative to the ever expanding need for protection. The further drawback of this type of protection is that the vessel is only protected while the guards are embarked. Armed resistance also triggers many other concerns.
Therefore, there is an urgent need for a primary, stand-alone, passive, non-lethal and cost-effective marine vessel defense apparatus and system that can be deployed by the vessel's own crew to immobilize an attacking watercraft (whether detected or undetected) before it can reach the vessel.
More recently, military vessels, cruise liners, and luxury yachts have also been the subject of terrorist suicide speedboat attacks. Such vessels have a generally static displacement and waterline (e.g., they maintain generally the same drift displacement whether under load or unloaded), which can benefit from a non-lethal, passive protection system that can be installed and stowed sub-surface so as to not affect the aesthetic appearance of the vessel.